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Chinese Expansion into the Western Hemisphere
Steven Carlson
therefore a net importer of minerals, fuel, and
agricultural goods. At the same time, China’s
economic growth has also been export-driven
(see fig 2). China’s growth in exports has
exceeded that of every other nation on earth.
With an export-driven economy, China has
been able to make leaps and bounds in its
economic development.

Introduction
Since the market-oriented reforms of Deng
Xiaoping, China has consistently been increasing
its economic interconnectedness with the outside
world. The amount of goods flowing both to and
from China is enormous and continues to grow.
In 2010, China surpassed Japan as the second
largest economy in the world. With an annual
GDP growth rate averaging at approximately 10
percent, and a highly adaptable, growth-oriented
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), one may only
roughly estimate the limits of China’s future
economic strength. This growth has caused China
to seek certain goods from abroad for new
economic developments in both exportation and
domestic consumption. In recent years, China’s
economic growth has led it to engage in
meaningful contact with Latin America. As a net
importer of primary products, China’s chief
reason for involvement in Latin America is for its
primary products. China’s expansion abroad is
driven by economic reasons, with international
politics being a means to greater economic gain.
As with its dealings in other countries, China
approaches Latin American countries with
pragmatic, state-specific strategies, playing to the
economic and political climates of its partners in
order to access much needed natural resources.
China’s foreign policy is driven mainly by
economic concerns and with little ideological
content, making China a new and powerful player
in the international scene.
Roughly around the turn of the century,
exports from Latin America to China began to
climb dramatically (see fig 1). This growth has
continued into the present. The majority of
these exports are primary products, which
include minerals, fuel, and agricultural
products.

Economic Drivers of China’s Natural
Resource Demand
In the early stages of China’s rapid growth,
products that China exported were mostly cheap,
low value-added goods. More recently, however,
China’s exports have become high-tech, high
value-added products. In 2006, China surpassed
the United States, the EU-27, and Japan to
become the largest high- tech exporter in the
world. Its high-tech exports grew 33 percent
annually from 1995 to 2008, much faster than
iii

the growth of overall exports. These new
products necessitate vast quantities of primary
products including minerals and fuel, the
products that Latin America has in abundance,
and the leading cause for China’s aggressive
economic expansion into the region.

The Chinese leadership works to maintain
its ambitious economic growth even with its
relatively low per capita levels of natural
resources. Over the past 18 years, China has
become a net importer of almost all major
natural resources. In 1993, China became a net
importer of oil. From 1995 and 2005, its oil
imports multiplied by a factor of five, becoming
the second largest consumer of oil. During the

The fundamentals for China’s interest in
Latin America are clear. China has the world’s
largest population, with over 1.3 billion people.
China’s economy has steadily been rising with
an annual GDP growth rate of over 10 percent
since 1978.ii China’s natural resource
production is not great enough to support the
speed of its economic growth. China is
167
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same time period, imports of iron ore grew 570
percent, copper by 738 percent, cobalt by 4,145
percent, and aluminum by 2,246 percent China
has looked to the developing world for these
products. China has developed into an exporter
of high-tech products through its investment in
education.vi
In the decade ending in 2004, enrollment in
higher education rose by a factor of 5, exceeding
13 percent of the college-age population.vii
Although percentagewise this is not a huge
number, in absolute terms it means that China
has over 2.4 million graduates per year, showing
no signs of ebbing. Furthermore, China’s
education is dominated by students of science
and engineering- two subjects crucial to the
development of high-tech industries and key to
China’s future growth.viii
Investments in infrastructure and research
and development are also signs that China’s
growth will be long-lasting. China spends at
least 1.2 percent of its GDP on research and
development, more than any Latin American
country.ix By 2020, the CCP has a formal goal of
making it 2.2 percent of GDP, with its main
objective to have 60 percent of the country’s
economic growth driven by science and
technology by 2020.x China’s investment in
fixed assets is about 40 percent of GDP, twice
that of the Latin American average.xi This
investment means better roads, better access to
electricity, and better telephone land lines; all
crucial to future economic growth.xii
Its investment in research and development
and internal infrastructure are powered by its
access to cheap bank credit. China’s people save
extraordinary amounts of money. Their savings
rate is approximately 50 percent of China’s
GDP. This offers the Chinese government access
to cheap credit. Provided with this capital, China
can develop forward looking economic
developments.
China’s demand for foreign natural
resources will continue along with its economic
advancement. China’s booming railway
construction, shipbuilding, and automobile
manufacturing sectors are all natural resourceintensive industries, necessitating primary
products such as metals, rubber, fuel, etc.
Ownership of domestically produced
automobiles has sky rocketed. In China, car
ownership more than doubled between 2004 and
2009, from 12 percent of the population to 28.
One report concludes that it is possible for car

ownership to top 50 percent of the population by
2015.xiii Growth in Chinese domestic
consumption continues to drive its need for
foreign natural resources, making China and
Latin America complementary partners.
With this economic growth has come a
higher standard of living for most Chinese, who
now demand more agricultural products from
abroad. China is by no means a food insecure
country; however, there are some agricultural
products that China cannot sufficiently supply to
its own people. While China is a major producer
of many agricultural products, overall it is a net
importer of bulk food commodities. China has
become a major market for imports of oilseeds
(ie. soybeans), vegetable oils, oil meal, and
grain.xiv
China’s Access to Latin American Natural
Resources
Latin America offers vast amounts of
agricultural products, metals, and fuel. Latin
America’s agricultural land per capita is three
times greater than China’s while forest land and
fresh water per capita is more than five times
greater. Latin America produces about 50 percent
of the world’s soybeans, over 20 percent of global
refined aluminum, 20 percent of the world’s zinc,
30 percent of the world’s oilseeds, 40 percent of
xv

the world’s copper

and at least 14 percent of
xvi

the world’s petroleum.
Latin America’s economic environment is
complementary to China’s. China has increased
its exports of high-tech products from
approximately 3 percent of total exports in 1990
to approximately 33 percent in 2004 (see fig 3).
Meanwhile, Latin America’s economy has
continued to rely on the exports of primary
products. Since China’s new high-tech industries
are natural resource-intensive, Latin America’s
economy is complementary to China’s. China’s
imports from Latin America have shown
xvii

tremendous growth (see fig 4).

168
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2011/iss1/20

2

Carlson: Chinese Expansion into the Western Hemisphere
xxiii

vegetable proteins, and soy sauce.
China
consumes about 40 million tons of soybeans
annually, and it is predicted that China may soon
import over 50 percent of the world’s soybean
production. Brazil and Argentina are two of the
largest soya producers in the world. In 2009,
China surpassed the U.S. as Brazil’s most
important trading partner. Argentina now devotes
over half of its farmable land to the production of
xxiv

soybeans. China’s economic demands now
determine economic production in large Latin
American economies.
While the physical distance between Latin
America and China is long and inhibitory to
trade, developments are in place to facilitate
commerce. Already under construction is a $5.25
billion expansion to the Panama Canal that will
add an extra lane and two sets of locks, tripling
cargo capacity through the canal, and allowing
China to have easier access to Latin America’s
eastern countries. China will be able to use its
large, more efficient cargo vessels to transport
raw materials from northeastern Latin America,
particularly Brazil for iron ore and Venezuela for
oil. Construction of the additional parts to the

These natural resources, however, are not
found in significant quantities in every Latin
American country. The bulk of the exports from
Latin America to China has been heavily
concentrated in the few countries that contain the
primary products that China demands. In 2008,
while the total volume of Latin American exports
to China accounted for only 5.6 percent of the
region’s overall exports, for a number of
countries in South America, China has become
their top export customer, including Chile and
Brazil’s. China has become the second most
important export customer for Argentina, Peru,

xxv

canal are projected to be completed by 2014.
Another possibility for linking the eastern Latin
American economies to the Pacific is through a
proposed “dry canal” through Colombia. China
and Colombia are in advanced talks to develop a
$ 7.6 billion 791 kilometer railway through
xxvi

Colombia. These talks represent China’s
aggressive push for greater access to Latin
American natural resources.

xx

Costa Rica, and Cuba. By 2008, just 10
commodities in only six Latin American
countries accounted for 74 percent of the region’s

China’s Engagement with Latin America
China engages natural resource-rich Latin
American trading partners regardless of their
political environment or the ideologies of their
governments. Its interactions with Latin
American countries are dependent on economic
opportunities. In market-oriented countries, it has
signed several Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
For example, China signed a FTA with Chile in
2006, with Peru in 2009, and with Costa Rica in
2010. China has also engaged Colombia for a

xxi

exports to China. These same 10 commodities
made up 91 percent of the region’s overall
commodity exports to China.xxii China’s
expansion in trade with Latin America has
primarily involved those countries with large
amounts of natural resources.
These states that China is engaging are
adapting their economies to meet China’s
demands. For example, China has had a profound
impact on Latin American soybean production.
Soybeans and soybean-derived products are an
important part of the Chinese diet and are used
for soy flour, soymilk, soybean oil, tofu, textured

xxvii

FTA.
In socialist, revolutionary countries
found in Latin America, China has engaged them
in state-level economic developments. The
leaders of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua
169
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have all increased their anti-American rhetoric,
turning to China as alternative leader in the
region. China has not shied away from business
opportunities with the revolutionary governments
of these countries. Its opportunistic play on Latin
America’s domestic politics is conducive to its
economic advancement in the region.

diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. Some countries in
the region still recognize Taiwan’s independence.

Other Chinese Concerns in Latin America
Besides China’s interest in Latin American
exports, it also works to open markets for the sale
of Chinese goods. Although Chinese firms seek to
sell their products to any country they can, Latin
America is particularly important for a number of
reasons. First, China would like to diversify its
export base. China relies mainly on developed
nations for the purchasing of their goods. With
the economic crisis of 2008 and the contraction of
consumption by developed nations, China
recognizes the need to diversify its export base to
middle-income economies as a way to further
guarantee the advancement of its economic

However, these countries are not large natural
resource producers, so they are not economically
significant to China. The countries that recognize
Taiwan’s independence are mostly located in
Central America and the Caribbean, and do not
serve as highly important natural resource
providers to the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). China uses its economic might to gain
adherents to its policy. For example, it gave $11
million in aid in 2005 to the Commonwealth of
Dominica and a $100 million grant over the next
six years in return for its recognition of the PRC.
The isolation of Taiwan in Latin America is
China’s main political concern; however, it does
not significantly effect China’s economic goals,
and its economic expansion into Latin America is

xxviii

goals.
The growth of Chinese goods being
imported to Latin America coincides with and is
comparable to that of Latin American goods
exported to China (see fig 5).
Latin Americans are important consumers
for knock-off products of things like designer
clothing, pirated music CDs, DVDs, footwear,

xxxiii

not to isolate Taiwan.
China’s government’s
main goal in Latin America is for natural
resources.

xxx

and other products. While this kind of trade is
illegal, many customs authorities are not able to
block the entry of these products or their sale,
because these organizations are often under
resourced, corrupt, or overwhelmed by the

China’s Government Facilitates Expansion
China’s government works to facilitate the
acquisition of foreign natural resources while
maintaining oversight of this crucial sector of the
economy. The CCP has reacted to China’s
dependence on foreign natural resources in two
ways. Firstly, it has opened its markets to foreign
suppliers by lifting quantitative restrictions on
almost all commodities and by curtailing import

xxxi

volume of products. Products like computers,
motorcycles, and cars from China are much
cheaper than those from the developed world.
While these products are often lower quality,
many Latin Americans cannot afford products
from developed countries. Therefore, “Latin
America, with a population of over 500 million
and an economy of nearly $3 trillion is an

xxxiv

subsidies.
Secondly, because they realize the
strategic importance of these commodities,
leaders in the government have worked to
maintain control over the production and trade of
these natural resources through State Owned

xxxii

attractive market for Chinese products.”
By
selling low quality, and even illegal goods, the
Chinese make economic gains from exporting to
Latin America.
China engages countries for economic
purposes, with ideological concerns only being a
secondary matter. However, there is one
exception to this rule. This exception pertains to
the extension of its “One China Policy,” or the

xxxv

Enterprises (SOEs).
The Chinese government works actively to
increase China’s natural resource acquisition
throughout the world. It supports and advances
SOEs specializing in natural resources in order to
170
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acquisition, China’s does not take moral,
political, or ideological concerns into account,
making it a rational, powerful player in the
international scene.
Fortunately, in recent years, Latin America
has not been the scene of large-scale human
rights violations and genocide, as has been the
case in Africa. However, Latin America has a
wide range of ideologies, both economic and
political, in the governments of the particular
nations. As a rational actor in the international
scene, China engages these states with
expedience, with the primary purpose being
natural resource acquisition. While there are
numerous examples that demonstrate China’s
pragmatic, state-specific strategies, China’s
dealings with Chile and Venezuela are two
exemplary cases of its adaptability in the region.
These two countries have seen the greatest
percent increase in their exports to China (see fig
6). They have very different governments,
economic systems, and reasons for increased
trade with China. Nevertheless, China has made
extraordinary gains in accessing their most
important natural resources.

keep oversight and control over the trade of these
commodities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Ministry of Commerce oversee the
execution of national policy governing natural
resources, with the exception being over oil. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Commerce are funded by the Ministry of Finance,
which provides cheap credit for the companies’
acquisition of natural resources. The oil trade is
supervised by the Energy Leading Group.
Because of the increased security importance of
oil, the Energy Leading group is chaired directly
by the Prime Minister. China’s government has a
coordinated strategy for natural resource
xxxvi

acquisition.
The Chinese government knows that natural
resources are connected to national security and
international politics. China has been
discriminated against in its quest for natural
resources in Canada and the United States
because of both security and nationalistic
xxxvii

reasons.
The natural resource markets are
strategic and can be volatile in times of
international crisis. It therefore behooves all
governments to work to ensure a diversified
portfolio of natural resource access. China
continues to diversify its sources of natural
resources.
China’s foreign policy is sometimes
controversial because of its seeming lack of moral
guidance. In Africa, it is notorious for doing
business with the worst of governments, in
countries where most Western companies will not
even enter because of humanitarian concerns. An
example of this is in Sudan, where China has
millions of dollars invested in the oil sector, and
has worked to ensure “stability,” by blocking
U.N. military action to stop the genocide
occurring there. While the West is steering clear
of Africa because of humanitarian and political
concerns, China has swiftly moved in for natural
resources. It is opportunistic in Africa, working to
win natural resources where the West does not
have a strong presence. China uses this same
pragmatism in Latin America, and is willing to
adapt its strategy to each country’s political and
economic concerns. Driven by its desire for
primary products, China engages each trading
partner opportunistically. Where China can access
natural resources through FTAs, China does so,
but where state-level development projects are
the only means, China engages on these terms.
When it comes to natural resource security and

China’s engagement with Chile
The historical relationship between China
and Chile and the recent uptake of Chilean natural
resources demonstrate how China’s foreign
policy in Latin America is based mainly on its
demand for primary products, the most important
of which is copper. China has supported Chile
politically in international organizations and its
leaders have engaged in numerous meaningful
state visits to Chile. Playing to Chile’s tradition
of free market economics, China engages Chile
with free market initiatives. At the same time,
state level action has been taken in many
instances for the production and sale of Chilean
minerals to China. China has successfully gained
profound interconnectivity with the Chilean
171
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Up until the turn of the century, China and
Chile’s relations maintained cordial but

economy, gaining access to Chilean minerals by
political and economic advancement.
Chile’s geography and abundant mineral
wealth make it a logical trading partner for
China. Lining the west coast of South America,
Chile’s ports serve as intermediate stops for
many goods flowing between the continent’s
interior; including Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia,
Paraguay, and Uruguay; and Pacific-bound
destinations like China. Ninety-eight percent of
Chilean exports come from nine primary-

xliii

lukewarm. Changes in Chile’s internal
government to a more centrist, liberal
democracy had little bearing on the SinoChilean relationship. Besides Chile’s support
for China’s membership in the World Trade
Organization in 1999, the 1990’s showed little
change in the interaction between these two
xliv

countries.
Since the 1990’s, however, China has
engaged Chile bilaterally and supported Chile in
international organizations, coinciding with a
stark growth in China’s imports of Chilean
goods. This correlation is no accident, as China
uses international politics for economic gain.
Between 1997 and 2006 Sino-Chilean bilateral

xxxix

product sectors.
Chile holds approximately
17 percent of the world’s copper reserves and
is the world’s largest producer of the metal. In
the first half of 2007, over 83 percent of
xl

Chile’s exports to China were copper. Chile’s
geographic location and vast natural resources
make it a crucial partner.
Chile was the first country in South
America to establish diplomatic relations with
China in January of 1971. Recognition of the
PRC came during the leadership of the Marxist
president Salvador Allende, who looked to
China’s Communist regime as a potential
political and economic partner. The two
nations engaged in trade; Chile exporting
mining products, fishmeal, and agricultural
products, and China selling cheap
manufactured goods. While formal diplomatic
relations between Chile and China began
during the presidency of this leftist, China’s
reasons for its relations with Chile were less
about their shared ideology than about China’s

xlv

trade increased by 641 percent. President
Hu’s visit to Chile in 2004 during the annual
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit demonstrated the increasing importance
of Chile and China’s economic relationship.
China supported Chile’s bid for a nonpermanent
seat on the United Nations Security Council in
xlvi

2003-2004. By 2007, the PRC became
Chile’s most important export customer, and by
2009 the PRC surpassed the United States as
Chile’s most important trading partner
xlvii

overall.
China’s political support of Chile
internationally coincides with increased trade
between the two.
Chile’s conservative, free trade tradition
has served as an opportunity for China to
increase its economic activity with them. Free
trade in Chile is a result of the market reforms
of the post-Allende era. The “Chicago Boys,” a
group of Chilean economists educated at the
Chicago School of Economics, influenced
Chile’s economy by starting free-market
oriented reforms that have made Chile a pioneer
in the region. Since 1985, Chile has had an
average GDP growth of approximately 6.9

xli

access to Chile’s resources.
With the fall of the Marxist regime in
Chile, China demonstrated its apathy for
Chile’s political ideology. In 1973, Allende
was ousted and the anti-Communist military
dictator Augusto Pinochet took power,
establishing a radically anti-Communist
government. During this phase in Chile, the
two nations retained economic and diplomatic
xlii

relations with low ideological content. The
new regime implemented free-market reforms
in an attempt to curb inflation and spur
economic growth, while at the same time
stifling civil liberties and violating human
rights. The target of this aggression was
usually Marxists and others who had leftleaning tendencies. Pinochet left Chile with a
legacy of anti- Communistic, free market
oriented reforms.

xlviii

percent.
Many attribute Chile’s economic
success to their free trade. In light of Chile’s
free trade tradition, China has engaged Chile
with free trade initiatives.
China increased its access to Chilean
natural resources through the groundbreaking
Sino-Chile FTA that went into effect in 2006,
guaranteeing increased trade and investment
between the two countries. In October of that
172
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year, China lifted tariffs on 2,834 products
imported from Chile, including its most
important commodity, copper. Chile gave duty-

imports from Chile rose 204.3 percent. This
rise was driven by copper. In that year,
China’s imports of refined copper and alloys
increased by 640 percent, imports of copper
waste and scrap went up 716 percent, imports
of copper ores went up 732 percent, imports of
copper wire went up 300 percent, and imports
of other copper products rose at comparative
levels. While the U.S.’ and Europe’s
economies were contracting, China’s ability to

xlix

free status to 5,891 products from China.
Chile’s exports to the PRC jumped 140 percent
in 2006, the first year in which the FTA went
l

into effect. The FTA represents China’s first
ever FTA with any nation outside of Asia. By
2009, trade between the two nations reached
li

lvii

record levels at $16.5 billion. In signing this
FTA, the Chinese were able to guarantee greater
access to the primary products that it needs from
Chile.
China has also engaged Chile on a state
level basis in order to better control the flow of
Chilean natural resources. In February 2006,
China and the Chilean copper company
CODELCO signed an agreement where China
agreed to purchase Chilean copper at a fixed
price, providing $550 million in advance to help
the Chileans increase their output in order to

buy Chilean copper increased.
The relationship between these two
countries has been so lucrative, that in 2010
the two states began a new phase in the FTA
to expand their free trade to include greater
access of service suppliers into a wide array of
sectors including mining and geological
prospecting. In August 2010, Mario Artaza,
head of Asia and Oceania affairs at the
Chilean foreign ministry said, “since 2005,
China and Chile have walked on a joint path
lviii

lii

toward free trade.” China’s imports of
Chilean primary products have increased
dramatically since the turn of the century.
Engaging Chile with bilateral FTAs and statelevel deals has given China greater access to
Chile’s natural resources, especially copper.
China has become an integral part of Chile’s
economy. China has achieved economic
interconnectivity with Chile because of its
adaptable strategies of bilateral engagement.

keep up with growing Chinese demand. This
agreement has an estimated value of about $2
liii

billion. Through state level deals, China is
able to better coordinate from government to
government the flow of natural resources.
The growth of China’s influence on
Chile’s copper industry has caused concerns of
Chinese dominance and possible dependency
for some in Chile. A controversial provision of
an accord between CODELCO and China
Minmetals, the Chinese state-owned mineral
company, was an option for them to buy up to
49 percent interest in a new Chilean mine,
Gabriela Mistral. To many Chileans, metals
and minerals are a national patrimony and the
possibility of foreign dominance of them

China’s engagement with Venezuela
Another example of China’s expedience in its
natural resources acquisition in Latin America is
in its relations with Venezuela. China’s
expansion in bilateral trade and investment into
Venezuela corresponds with the leadership of
the revolutionary, anti-American president
Hugo Chavez. Chavez offers China access to
Venezuela’s petroleum as a way to increase
economic and political relations between the
two countries. This is driven by his desire to
lower Venezuela’s dependence on the United
States for consumption of its oil. With a foreign
policy in Latin America based primarily on its
quest for natural resources, China takes
advantage of the political situation of Venezuela
in order to access Venezuela’s vast reserves of
petroleum.
Although Venezuela does have large

liv

touches a nationalistic sensitivity. When in
2007 China Minmetals expressed its interest in
purchasing 49 percent of the mine, workers in
one of CODELCO’s leading mines protested,
lv

causing a sharp reduction in its production.
The Chilean government decided to forbid the
Chinese from exercising its option. This
growing concern by many in Chile shows the
profundity of China’s presence.
China’s trillions of dollars in reserves
allowed it to continue its natural resources
buying spree from Chile even during the
Financial Crisis of 2008. In 2008, Chinese
173
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reserves of other natural resources such as
aluminum, iron, gold, and coal, by far its most
important and abundant natural resource is
petroleum. Venezuela has the second largest
reserves of oil in the world, just behind Saudi

for the central government. The American
companies ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil,
Venezuela’s two biggest partners in heavy oil
development at the time, decided to pull out of
the country all together and settle it by

lix

Arabia Brief.

lxvii

Venezuela is the seventh largest

international arbitration.
Seeing
opportunities left by these private companies,
China has worked to take advantage of the
situation.
Chavez has clearly positioned himself as
both anti-American and pro-Chinese. In 2006,
at a U.N. conference in New York, Chavez
was quoted as saying "The American empire
is doing all it can to consolidate its
hegemonistic system of domination, and we
cannot allow him [President George W. Bush]
to do that. We cannot allow world dictatorship

lx

exporter of oil in the world. Oil makes up 80
percent of Venezuela’s total export revenue and
contributes to approximately 50 percent of the
lxi

central government’s income.

It is responsible
lxii

for about one-third of the country’s GDP.
Including the deposits of hard-to-reach oil
deposits in the Orinoco belt, Venezuela has
approximately 211 billion barrels of proven oil
lxiii

reserves. The majority of Venezuela’s oil is
consumed by the United States.
Venezuela’s leadership before Chavez
showed little interest in economic and
diplomatic relations with China, and there was
little bilateral activity. However, Venezuela
granted China diplomatic relations in 1974. The
first visit to China by a Venezuelan president
did not occur until 1981.
Likewise, the first visit of a Chinese
premier to Venezuela did not occur until 1985,
11 years after Venezuela established

lxviii

to be consolidated."
President Chavez
blames the attempted pro-United States coup
in 2002 on the United States government, and
was angered that the United States
diplomatically supported the usurping regime.
Since the failed coup, Chavez’ anti- American
sentiment has grown. Chavez desires to
decrease Venezuela’s dependence on the U.S.
as its most important importer of oil and
would like to increase the prominence of the
newly rising power, the PRC. In a 2004 state
visit to Beijing, Chavez said “You should
realize we’ve been producing and exporting
petroleum for more than 100 years, but they
were 100 years of domination by the United
States. Now we are free and at the disposal of

lxiv

diplomatic relations with China. In 1996,
Premier Li Peng visited Venezuela. With only
three high-level visits up until 1999, relations
between the two nations were of little
lxv

consequence.
The political relationship between China
and Venezuela increased dramatically with the
election of Hugo Chavez. Immediately after
winning, Chavez made his first visit to the
PRC in October 1999, and repeated visits six
more times by 2011. Chavez’ statist, anti-freeenterprise stance and desire to increase
political and economic ties with China have
strengthened the relationship of the two. In
2001, China named Venezuela a “strategic
partner,” signaling its desire for increased
cooperation and bilateral progress.
Because of Chavez, Venezuela has
become an undesirable market for many
Western companies. Starkly anti-capitalist, in
2006 he nationalized all of the oil fields in the
Orinoco region that were owned by foreign
companies, resulting in an increased
ownership stake from 40 percent to 60 percent

lxix

the great Chinese nation.” Statements like
these give China confidence for aggressive
development in the petroleum sector with
Venezuela.
However, there are significant obstacles
to Chavez’ desire to meaningfully decrease
Venezuela’s dependence on the Unites States.
First is the U.S.’ close proximity to
Venezuela. Just across the Caribbean, sending
petroleum to the United States makes the most
economic sense. That contrasts to China’s far
distance and the fact that in order to reach
China’s shores, ships must either go through
the Panama Canal, around South American, or
around Africa. Today, about 60 percent of
Venezuela’s oil exports go to the United
States, making Venezuelan oil imports 11
percent of all oil imports to the United
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lxx

successfully with bilateral deals, almost
always involving petroleum. In 2007, China
and Venezuela signed several bilateral
agreements, the most important of which was
a $6 billion development fund to deepen
collaboration in the areas of energy,
technology, and financing, particularly with

States. Petroleos de Venezuela SA
(PDVSA), Venezuela’s state owned oil
company owns five oil refineries in the United
States and has partial ownership in four
lxxi

through its U.S. subsidiary, CITGO.
Nevertheless, Chavez has pledged to
increase its supply of oil to the PRC
significantly. In 2004, on a visit to Beijing, he
told the Chinese that his country would put
many of its oil facilities at the disposal of
China, saying that Chinese firms would be
allowed to operate 15 mature oil fields in the
heart of Venezuela, capable of producing more

lxxviii

regards to the Sino-Venezuelan oil trade.
Of the total $6 billion, the Chinese
Development Bank contributed $4 billion,
while the Venezuela’s National Development
lxxix

Fund contributed $2 billion.
By 2011, the
fund has reached $12 billion, with another $4
billion coming from China and $2 billion from

lxxii

than one billion barrels.
In 2008 he pledged
that Venezuela would supply China with
500,000 barrels of oil per day by 2009. lxxiii

lxxx

Venezuela. Also in 2007, Venezuela signed
agreements with the China National Petroleum
Company (CNPC) for cooperative projects in
the petroleum sector, most importantly an
increased participation of CNPC in
Venezuela’s Orinoco reserves. There have
been over 300 bilateral investment
commitments between the two countries, and
by 2009, China became Venezuela’s second-

According to his statements, he actually came
lxxiv

close, with 460,000 barrels.
Thanks to
Wikileaks, it has been discovered that much of
this oil was sold to China at as little of a price
as $5 per barrel when the market price was
lxxv

$78 per barrel. According to an unnamed
official at PDVSA, China then sold the cheap

lxxxi

largest trading partner.
China, with vast reserves of currency,
takes advantage of Venezuela’s inability to
attract meaningful private investment. Since
private companies are often wary of
investment into Venezuela, many development
projects are underfunded. But with the
political connections between China and
Venezuela, China has more confidence in
Venezuela’s ability to pay back its loans in oil.
The China Development Bank (CDB)
provided a soft loan in April 2010 to
Venezuela of $20 billion, to be repaid over a

lxxvi

oil elsewhere at a “sizable” profit.
The
Chinese willingly accept the economic
concessions that a politically driven Venezuela
offer them.
While the Venezuelan-produced statistics
show 460,000 barrels per day in 2009, the
Chinese- produced statistics show
equivocating figures. For the first few months
of 2010, Chinese figures showed that China
was importing only an average of 132,000
barrels per day in the first few months that
year. Also, a U.S. Embassy cable published by
the Spanish newspaper “el País” shows
mismatches on Venezuelan data, citing a
PDVSA official’s January 2010 estimates of
oil exports to China that was nearly five times
greater than the Chinese figures on such
imports. To save face at not accomplishing his
goal of 500,000 barrels per day, Chavez both
offered oil to China at a steep discount and
gave fake statistics. While the importance of
bilateral trade between China and Venezuela
has not reached the levels that Chavez
purports it to, China does recognize the
opportunities that an ideological pro-China

lxxxii

ten year period, guaranteed by oil supplies.
By trading its vast reserves of currency, China
guarantees access to Venezuela’s oil.
China has aggressively pursued state
level deals with Venezuela for petroleum.
Chávez offers China an opportunity to gain a
foothold in the region- the goal of which in the
end is greater energy and natural resource
security. China obviously is using Venezuela’s
political environment and statist leader to get
access to their oil and has successfully taken
advantage of the political situation to do so.

lxxvii

government in Venezuela offers.
China has engaged Venezuela
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Although China’s government is in name
Communist, its foreign policy is driven by its
economic markets. It is also ironic that the
world’s foremost Communist nation is now
playing the role of a large, dominating
economic power. Latin American nations
should pay close attention to Chinese action in
the region, and work to mitigate domination of
their economies by China.
China’s export driven economic growth
has led it to Latin America for the acquisition of
rich natural resources. Latin American countries
have adapted to China’s demand with economic
developments for the extraction and movement
of natural resources to the Pacific Ocean. China
has engaged the different players in the region
with thoughtful and often opportunistic
strategies and has gained significant influence
in the region. It will be interesting to see the
future of Sino-Latin American relations given
the possible implications of China’s economic
advancement in the region.

Conclusion
Exports of Latin American primary products
to China have increased tremendously since the
turn of the 21st century. China’s economic
growth, powered by its high-tech exports and
responsible governance, is the main reason for
the uptake in these products. Latin America
holds some of the world’s largest reserves of
minerals, agricultural products, and fuel. Latin
American economies have adapted to Chinese
demand through developments of industries and
the growth of transportation infrastructure.
China works with Latin American governments
to gain access to their natural resources with a
state-specific, pragmatic approach, adapting
itself to the economic and political
considerations of the countries in question.
China’s government also maintains oversight of
the process of natural resource acquisition. The
examples of China’s advancement with Chile
and Venezuela show the Chinese government’s
ability to work in starkly different economic,
political, and ideological environments for the
main purpose of the acquisition of natural
resources.
Due to China’s growing influence in the
region, China’s expansion into Latin America
may threaten United States hegemony in the
Western Hemisphere. The United States has
traditionally been the economic and political
hegemonic power in the Western Hemisphere.
While the United States was busy dealing with
issues in the Middle East such as the Iraq War
and the War in Afghanistan, the Chinese
advanced into the United States’ “back yard.”
China now holds more economic and political
sway with a few important Latin American
countries. The United States must develop a
comprehensive strategy to deal with the growth
of Chinese influence in its hemisphere.
China’s advancement into Latin America
could also be seen as a form of neocolonialism.
While many Latin American countries have
feared economic dominance by and dependence
on the powerful Western states like the United
States and Western Europe, they may find that
China is no different. Latin American
economies are becoming even more dependent
on natural resource exports because of the
growth of the Chinese presence. It is
particularly ironic that the Venezuelans work to
decrease their dependence on the United States
by increasing their dependence on China.
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